The EMH and Me

Following the 2008 financial crisis, a small cottage industry emerged to critique some of the economic theories that were somehow accountable for the institutional problems America faced. One of the most prime targets was the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, a theory that has been used to both justify and condemn just about every possible financial activity.

I think a lot of us here would argue against the strong ideological implications of the efficient market hypothesis, at least until our libertarian friends start spamming the comments. But the political aspects of the EMH do an incredible disservice to the empirical reality that Eugene Fama described: it is practically (but not entirely) impossible for investors to regularly outperform the market.

This simple but powerful idea drove the formation of an entire industry's worth of index funds, which remain, by far, the best possible investment vehicle for individuals.

Congrats on your Nobel Dr. Fama. It is well deserved.

Cochrane sums it all up beautifully:

Gene’s ideas are alive, and his contributions define our central understanding of financial markets today. His characterizations of time varying bond, stock, and commodity returns, and the three-factor model capturing value and size effects remain the baseline for work today. His characterization of predictable foreign exchange returns from the early 1980s is still one of the 2 or 3 puzzles that define international finance research. The critics still spend their time attacking Gene Fama. For example, researchers in the “behavioral finance” tradition are using evidence from psychology to give some testable content to an alternative to Gene’s efficient market ideas, to rebut caustic comments like mine above about “fads.” This is remarkable vitality. Few other idea from the early 1970s, including ideas that won well-deserved Nobel prizes, remains an area of active research (including criticism) today.

Of course, some will say that the latest crash "proves" markets aren't "efficient." This attitude only expresses ignorance. Once you understand the definition of efficiency and the nature of its tests, as made clear by Gene 40 years ago, you see that the latest crash no more "proves" lack of efficiency than did the crash of 1987, the great slide of 1974, the crash of 1929, the panic of 1907, or the Dutch Tulip crisis. Gene's work, and that of all of us in academic finance, is about serious quantiative scientific testing of explicit economic models, not armchair debates over anecdotes. The heart of efficient markets is the statement that you cannot earn outsize returns without taking on “systematic” risk. Given the large average returns of the stock market, it would be inefficient if it did not crash occasionally.

Gene’s work has had profound influence on the financial markets in which we all participate.

For example, In the 1960s, passively managed mutual funds and index funds were unknown. It was taken for granted that active management (constant buying and selling, identifying "good stocks" and dumping "bad stocks") was vital for any sensible investor. Now all of us can invest in passive, low cost index funds, gaining the benefits of wide diversification only available in the past to the super rich (and the few super-wise among those). In turn, these vehicles have spurred the large increase in stock market participation of the last 20 years, opening up huge funds for investment and growth. Even proposals to open social security systems to stock market investment depend crucially on the development of passive investing. The recognition that markets are largely “efficient,” in Gene’s precise sense, was crucial to this transformation.

Unhappy investors who lost a lot of money to hedge funds, dot-coms, bank stocks, or mortgage-backed securities can console themselves that they should have listened to Gene Fama, who all along championed the empirical evidence – not the “theory” – that markets are remarkably efficient, so they might as well have held a diversified index.

Ron Paul's Unusual Proposition

Ladies and gents, Dean Baker endorses a Ron Paul policy idea. No matter the subject, that's always worth sharing. As Baker writes over in The New Republic,

In short, Representative Paul has produced a very creative plan that has two enormously helpful outcomes. The first one is that the destruction of the Fed’s $1.6 trillion in bond holdings immediately gives us plenty of borrowing capacity under the current debt ceiling. The second benefit is that it will substantially reduce the government’s interest burden over the coming decades. This is a proposal that deserves serious consideration, even from people who may not like its source.

I'm no expert on monetary policy, but there's some interesting debt ceiling theory crafting here. Granted, just like all of the other fantasy intervention scenarios, all of this comes with a giant caveat: we have to assume that the need for an intervention won't spur some form of market panic. We've seen a few times already how these can become catastrophically self-sustaining. Once that threshold is crossed, it doesn't matter what the Fed does.

But let's just assume that won't happen for a moment. Instead, we'll pretend that the Fed has announced with sufficient time before the debt ceiling deadline that it intends to intervene in order to ensure stability in the global financial system. This is totally within their mandate, so people wouldn't be that surprised if the Fed chose to do this. But, surprisingly, they'll announce that they plan on executing the "Ron Paul Plan."

Paul's idea, as Baker happily points out, rests on one of the great paradoxes of modern finance. The Fed is largest buyer of treasuries and by far the largest holder of US debt. All of the principal and interest that the Fed earns is eventually returned to the government. It's weird to think about, but the Fed is actually a profit center. In 2012, it sent 77 billion dollars back to the treasury.

It is totally within reason for the Fed to notify the government that it no longer intends to collect on its bonds. Or, as Ron Paul dramatically puts it, the Fed could "destroy" the bonds that it holds. Either way, this would allow the administration to issue new debt, since the debt ceiling is set at a specific dollar amount. The Fed holds about a trillion dollars in different government securities right now. Cancelling this debt would solve the debt ceiling problem for about a year.

It's an especially nice solution since there is no legal gray area. A bondholder is not legally obligated to collect his or her debt. We never have to deal with this under normal circumstances since everyone does want their money (why else would you buy a bond?). That doesn't change the fact that it is totally possible to just walk away. If the Fed walks away, the government gets a whole new chance to borrow again. Think of it like some giant bureaucratic jubilee.

So what are the consequences? As Baker points out, the Fed uses its treasuries as the key tool in balancing the availability of money and the ability of banks to lend. This is all a part of short-term interest rate targeting. If the Fed wants to reduce the aggregate amount of lending, it sells its treasuries to banks. The banks pay for these treasuries out of their reserves, and the banking system now has less money available to lend.

By bringing up this issue, Baker is taking into account a risk that is normally top priority on the right. All of the Fed's efforts over the last five years have greatly expanded the monetary base, creating the potential for inflation. The Fed's huge reserve of treasuries are insurance against this risk. If the economy grows stronger, and if inflation starts to creep upwards, all the Fed needs to do is sell off some of its bonds, reduce the money supply and cool things down a little.

Baker isn't in the tinfoil hat group that believes we are waiting for hyperinflation. That's normally Ron Paul's gig. Everyone else recognizes that we have far too low of growth to even experience normal inflation right now. This is why the Fed continues to engage in Quantitative Easing, which is nothing more than the Fed buying up all sorts of securities from banks so that they have more money to lend. But that doesn't change the fact that the Fed needs to be on guard against potential inflation in the future, and it needs tools to deal with it.

Without its treasuries, the Fed obviously can play the same game anymore. If inflation were to rise, it would need something to sell in order to reduce the monetary supply. Destroying the bonds that it holds severely reduces its stock of available assets, and it also gets rid of the most typical and liquid asset that the Fed owns. But that doesn't mean that the Fed would be totally helpless.

The Fed has another tool to manage the overall amount of money lent that it tends not to use all that often. As you know, banks are required to hold a certain amount of money in reserve as backstop for all of their outstanding loans. This reserve amount is set by the Fed, and they are the only governing body that has a say in the matter. If it wanted to, the Fed could go out there today and tell banks that they need to hold greater reserves. Banks would have to call in some outstanding loans to meet the new, higher reserve requirement, and this would ultimately have the exact same effect as the Fed selling its Treasuries.

Again, assuming no market panic, this is a totally viable scenario. Despite its source, it actually makes a whole lot more sense and poses way less risk than many of the other schemes proposed. If the Fed destroys its bonds, no other bondholder is affected. They can all collect as before and the "dollar hegemony" can keep on trucking to the next crisis. There wouldn't be a freeze up in lending, nor would the Fed remain powerless to prevent future inflation. The biggest problem I see is that this is kind of a one-off. The Fed wouldn't be able to build up its bond portfolio quickly enough to pull the same stunt again.

There's obviously a legitimacy problem too. What happens the next time Congress refuses to raise the debt ceiling? Unfortunately, very few of possible workarounds solve this problem directly. For that reason, this is all a bit of fantasy. That doesn't mean that it isn't fun.

I hear Congress is trying to offer at least a short-term raise. It should give us about six weeks to come up with other platinum coin kinds of ideas. I don't mind. It's much better than contemplating the apocalypse, that's for sure. Until next time.

Game Theory for Government Shutdowns

While there are many ways to try and understand the government shutdown, I like to take a game theory perspective. By focusing on incentives, it helps clarify each side's behavior, and it helps paint a road map for the next couple of weeks. Even if it's all pure speculation, and there's a nearly 100 percent guarantee that things will turn out differently, it's still intellectually stimulating. So let's give it a go!

I'll start with Chait's description:

Obama’s incentive structure is simple, then: Allowing Republicans to default on the debt now is better than trading something that allows them to threaten it later. His best option is to refuse to negotiate the debt ceiling and have the House raise it before October 17. His next best option is to refuse to negotiate the debt ceiling, allow default, and never have to go through it again. Bargaining merely postpones, and worsens, the next default crisis. No negotiated debt-ceiling price is small enough to be acceptable. There is therefore no circumstance under which bargaining for a debt-ceiling hike makes sense, even if the alternative is certain default.

 I think he's wrong on one point. Obama's second best option, before default, is the Constitutional problems created by his unilateral intervention. Raising the debt limit on its own (or just abolishing it), invites a continued fight with Congress, but it avoids economic harm. He's stuck with a shut-down government anyway, a continued political crisis is essentially the same thing.

One of the biggest mistakes of most observers on the left is to label the behavior of Republicans in Congress as crazy. This isn't just offensively dismissive, it does the observer a huge disservice by ignoring the other side's incentive structure. In fact, as Justin Fox writes over at HBR, the incentive structure for Republicans is very clear and very easy to decipher. Especially since it's completely rational!

Let’s consider what House Republicans have learned from their two years of debt-limit brinkmanship. They have learned, first of all, that it works. They got the White House to agree to a bunch of automatic spending cuts (the sequester) in 2011, and then in early 2013 they were able, from what seemed to be an exceptionally weak bargaining position after President Obama’s reelection, to keep most of the Bush-era tax cuts from expiring and to force yet another debt-ceiling battle only a few months later. More broadly, Republican office-holders and activists have learned over the past couple of decades that making what at first sound like unreasonable demands (no new taxes, no gun control) and repeating them for years on end can actually shift the terms of the debate to the point where the demands seem normal. It has been a successful strategy.

There have been downsides to the GOP’s debt-ceiling brinkmanship. It was a drag on economic growth, for one thing, but that’s pretty distant and diffuse and hard to prove. More tangibly, it also probably played a role in the Republicans losing six seats in the House and failing to unseat President Obama in the 2012 election.

From the perspective of the 30-odd hardline members of the House GOP that for the sake of convenience I’ll call the Tea Party, though, this wasn’t actually bad news. Their districts tend to be pretty safely Republican, so their jobs aren’t at risk. A smaller Republican majority in the House increases their leverage within the caucus. And in part because Republicans controlled the redistricting process in most states after the 2010 census (a byproduct of the anti-Democrat backlash in the 2010 elections), they don’t have to worry much about the GOP losing its House majority soon. As for Obama’s victory over a Republican nominee the Tea Party never fully embraced, that wasn’t the worst thing in the world either — it certainly helps with fundraising and energizing the base. So while it has become popular to label the Congressional Tea Partiers, and their seemingly increased zeal after a lost election, as “crazy,” most of their behavior can be pretty readily explained by self-interest and learning from recent experience.

Going into the shutdown, the Republicans now have an even smaller incentive to reach a decision before the debt limit than before. Paul Ryan stated this pretty clearly awhile back. We're guaranteed to see no resolution before then. If we do, they're basically guaranteed to face backlash for creating a crazy mess for no reason. They're probably better off digging in.

Moreover, they too have very little pressure to compromise as long as the Hastert rule is maintained, since electoral consequences are small. This leads to some fun possible scenarios. Even the most extreme options aren't totally off the table.

Since Republicans don't think the President will let the country default, they'll intentionally skip the debt ceiling deadline. We'll get a unilateral debt ceiling increase and Republicans will get the opportunity to impeach Obama. This is something they've always wanted, and it fulfills the underlying motivation for this mess. They believe Obama's presidency is illegitimate, and now they get to show it. The Senate will acquit, and maybe then, and only then will we see sides back down. But that basically guarantees a shuttered government for something like a month, and it firmly establishes the precedent for more insane behavior in the future. Fun times.

Obviously, this is one of just many options. And this sort of events would seem totally insane for most people around the world. And yet, both sides would still be operating in a rational way that maximizes a sense of well-being over a certain times. Uncrazy behavior, under unusual incentive structures, often has some really crazy consequences.