What Comes Next in Ukraine? A Debate (2)

After the downing of flight MH17, it's worthwhile to take stock of our knowledge of the events on the ground. The tragedy can lead to two very disparate outcomes. On the one hand, the crash could encourage Europe to put the kind of pressure on Russia needed to finally end its meddling. On the other, both sides might see little reason to avoid escalation. In a previous post, I presented the case for the former outcome. I'll now discuss the latter.

While a case could be made that the events in Ukraine have finally reached a decisive point, there is no guarantee that pressure from Europe will force Russia to stop encouraging its proxy war. This is the argument presented by political scientist Paul D'Anieri in The Monkey Cage, which is hosted by The Washington Post. As he writes,

To see why a cease-fire works to Russia’s advantage, the Ukrainian leadership need only look to Ukraine’s western border, where a slice of its neighbor Moldova known as Transnistria has been occupied by pro-Russian forces since 1992. The conflict began when a group that did not want Moldova to secede from the Soviet Union took up arms, with extensive support from the Soviet/Russian military. A cease-fire was declared in July 1992, and the conflict has remained “frozen” ever since.

The Ukrainians can also look to Azerbaijan, where the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh has been occupied by Armenia—with support from Russia—for nearly the same period, again after a conflict and cease-fire. Or it can look to Georgia, where a similar practice was followed, until Russia actually invaded, detaching Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia in 2008.

Indeed, what is happening in Eastern Ukraine seems not to be a one-off conflict, but rather the most recent in a series of moves by Russia to exploit local tensions and seize bordering territory. The downing of a civilian airliner was madness, but there is method in everything else that Russia has done in Eastern Ukraine.

Of course, the Ukrainians can also look at their own experience with Crimea, where the international community briefly registered outrage at its annexation before returning to business as usual. Russia has spent considerable time and resources building its influence in Europe and in Washington, and it understands how to wield it. While the Dutch and British governments have been vocal in their outrage over the incident, other European leaders have been quieter, preferring, it seems, to try to preserve a constructive working relationship with Russia. Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany has been particularly reticent, perhaps because of Germany’s long-standing coziness with Russia, and perhaps because of her outrage at the recent revelations of U.S. spying on Germany.

It is natural to ask what ‘the West’ can do to stop the conflict. Raising the cost for Russia may help to deter future aggression, but an enormous amount of empirical research on sanctions shows that their efficacy is extremely spotty. NATO governments have so far has been unwilling to incur major costs to punish Russia. Russia reads this level of commitment clearly: In response to the sanctions enacted over Crimea, Deputy Prime Ministry Dmitry Rogozin tweeted that “NATO people” should “send me your teeth ground in impotent rage.”

In sum, both the Russian and Ukrainian governments are much more realistic about how this will really play out than are international optimists. The Russians know that holding the territory is key, that they can deflect serious consequences, and the demanding a cease-fire helps them do both. The Ukrainians know that the only way they will get their territory back is to take it by force.

D'Aneri's argument fits nicely within the framework of a classic example of Game Theory - the prisoners' dilemma. Most people are aware of this decision-making model, but for those that aren't here's the gist. Under a prisoners' dilemma, two agents are forced to decide whether or not they cooperate. In the case of two prisoners, they can cooperate by both remaining silent. If they do, they have the chance of receiving a reduced sentence. On the other hand, if either testifies against the other, he could potentially avoid prison altogether while condemning his partner to a long sentence. If both agree to testify, both will suffer.

The available choices can be formally described in this kind of table that follows. Game theorists analyze these scenarios by precisely quantifying the potential losses each agent faces in the possible scenarios, but we don't need to go that far for this example.

The prisoners' dilemma, as described by National Affairs.

In the case of Russia and Ukraine, each country is presented with the following choices. They can choose to cooperate by seeking a diplomatic solution, or they can choose noncooperation through military escalation and increased violence. Cooperation would benefit both countries most in the end, by avoiding war, but the costs of backing down whole the other side pushes on are so high that the optimal solution for both sides is to fight on.

Ukraine cannot accept the invasion of Donetsk. It had to fight on, and it has to be prepared to invade Crimea if it is able to secure a position in the East. The current government has almost no legitimacy as it is. How could they claim a mandate to rule if they cannot ensure territorial integrity? Moreover, much of Ukraine's wealth is located in the east, which is home to a majority of its heavy industry. Ukraine is already facing an economic crisis. It's hard to imagine how the western half of the country would function if it did actually split.

Similarly, given the war fever gripping the country, Russia faces such huge domestic costs from backing down - national humiliation at the top of the list, that I'm not sure that we should rule out the chance of an invasion. After all, Russia is now using artillery on the boarder to assault the Ukrainian army advancing on Donetsk. The media have attached so much national value to this 'rescue' of Novorossiya that Putin's standing as a leader is now at stake.

Framing the issue this way, it's hard to see a good reason for Ukraine to stop bombing and Russia to stop shelling. The longer this continues, a diplomatic solution will only become less likely. Residents of Solvyansk and Donetsk are irate by the Ukrainian army's inability to distinguish between rebels and civilians. As I wrote in a previous article, a thousand of people have died and a hundred thousand have already fled. The bad blood won't suddenly dissipate if the Ukrainian and Russian governments magically decide to talk.

Even if this is the beginning of the event, we should definitely expect more violence along the way. Both sides benefit by applying as much force as possible during this critical moment. This makes me wonder if there is a point where the strategic calculus changes. Is there a way to make the price of escalation high enough so that neither side wants to push things further? If we wish to draw the line, where would we want that to be? Would we allow for a Russian invasion?

This is a very difficult question to answer. We have no meaningful alliances with Ukraine, and the threat of nuclear war with Russia lurks, even if it is still very unlikely. We couldn't accept that, which makes me believe that the US and Europe might eventually decide that a Russian invasion is tolerable. We allowed this in Hungary and Prague during the Cold War, and it's arguable that the stakes were much higher then.

What Comes Next Ukraine? A Debate (1)

The downing of flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine is the type of tragedy that has the potential to completely reshape the West's involvement in the ongoing crisis. The outrage in England and Amsterdam is palpable, and even normally reticent countries like Germany seem to have adopted a much more aggressive attitude towards Russia over the last week. 

These are the kind of singular moments that demand we once again take stock of our knowledge of the events on the ground. It's an excellent time to ask ourselves, what comes next? Does a tragedy of this scale lead to a resolution of the rebellion or is it only another step in a dangerous environment that is quickly escalating? 

Since forecasting is inevitably an exercise in speculation,  it is a disservice to any reader to present only one side of the argument. So, I'll offer both. This article will present my case for why I believe that this is the herald of the beginning of the end. I'll follow it with an argument for why the situation might only become more dangerous in the coming weeks.

I don't believe that these arguments are fully mutually exclusive. Hopefully, seeing a more nuanced presentation of this issue will give readers room to synthesize their own opinions about what might happen and why.

What the Hell Is Happening In Ukraine?

I have some friends in Ukraine who might disagree with me on this, and I have other Eurasian expert friends who are better at this than me, but here's the gist of my impression of this:

1) The events in Ukraine are related to a very long political struggle about the future regional direction of the country. The struggle has been flaring up ever since the Orange Revolution 2004. But its roots stretch back hundreds of years, connecting to the fights between the Russian, Ottoman and Holy Roman Empires for control of the region.

Catholic Ukrainian speakers in the West feel closer to Poland, Lithuania and the rest of Europe. Orthodox Russian speakers in the East, along with people strongly affiliated with the USSR (like the Tatars in the South), obviously want strong ties to Russia.

There are lots of fun ways to visualize these challenges. WaPo shows some of these maps here, along with a good explanation of the situation.

While the challenges are not necessarily historically determined, there are obvious historical trends at play. Kiev is the ancient home of the Russian people, but the Ukraine has always been a battle ground between Turks, Slavs and Catholics. These historical tensions are reflected in the country's current political challenges.

2) Ukraine is a mess economically and the government is corrupt and ineffective. The latter isn't necessarily new to the region (KZ is no different), but the citizens of post-Soviet states are more tolerant of the BS and the bribes when everyone is seeing some sort of progress. In that way, they're no different than the citizens of Western countries, who's citizens tend to ignore government failings when times are good, but they get a little crazier during economic struggles (enter Tea Party).

Ukraine is essentially broke and owes a lot of money to all of the usual international institutions. The most important issue in Ukraine right now is finding some way to get economic growth. This frame needs to be placed on any other discussion of the crisis.

3) The EU started this mess. You don't need to mince words. Politics in Ukraine is about balancing the aspirations of both the East and West of the country. The EU threw a bad trade deal at Ukraine that would have been harmful economically in the short term (subjecting them to IMF austerity terms) while waving a giant middle finger at the East who still wants strong ties with Russia. It would have been crippling politically for Yanukovich and the interests he represents. He had to turn it down.

Worse, Ukraine was expected to get take on very harsh terms for what was barely better than nothing from the EU. They continue on their "way" to trade integration, but they got nothing in the line of things like immigration rights. The Spectator sums it up well.

In spite of stringing Kiev along with pretty words about a European future, the EU could offer only $800 million , via the IMF, and that came at the price of exceptionally painfully economic reforms. Ukraine would have been subjected to the same devastation of its agriculture, on which it depends, as Romania and Bulgaria were in their pre-accession period. Its industry would have collapsed as well. Russia, by contrast, has been able to offer nearly 20 times this sum in loans to prevent Ukraine from becoming insolvent, and it is the biggest market for Ukrainian exports – bigger than the whole of the EU put together.

Which deal would you choose? The EU probably recognized this too, which is why they played their trump card. By creating a crisis (calling off all EU integration talks in one fell swoop), they can hope to force Yanukovich out of power undemocratically, putting in the other, more favorable part of the elite. Not surprising, the EU is now forcing sanctions on Ukraine, furthering the crisis.

4) During calm moments, the people in the streets are largely average Western Ukrainians who hope that some sort of European integration will reduce the corruption, impotency and insanity of the Ukrainian political system. Honestly, it's a little naive, but their intentions (liberal, transparent, just) are good.

But the real power behind the protest is a bunch of extreme right neo-Nazi parties. The Russian press has covered this well, and these groups are quite prominent in Ukraine, going by names like Far Right Sector and Trident. Russia tends to throw around this term a little too liberally (since this is ultimately the conflict that defines modern Russia), but it is mostly apt here.

Svoboda (the right political party that is the most moderate of the groups involved and actually has ministers in Parliament) marched around new year celebrating a Ukrainian nationalist leader that fought along side the Nazis against the Soviets. This is pretty typical of the group; their former name is the “Social-National Party of Ukraine” (ring a bell?). You hear lots of nationalist chants in the squares, along with insults about how the current government consists of "Jews."

To be fair, racist thugs are being employed by the government to counter the protests too. (The Berkut has pep talks where it calls the protesters a bunch of Jews). But it's important to remember that either side would act appallingly regardless of who was in political power.

5) Yulia Tymoshenko was just released from jail, which should make the lead up to the snap elections really nuts. Like everyone else in Ukrainian politics, she's corrupt and her party was pretty terrible while in government. But she is an obvious unifying figurehead for the movement (more than Klitschko or any of the other politicians in "talks"), and she is certainly liked by the West. We'll get to watch her propped up on a pedestal for awhile even though she's incredibly unpopular back home. It's not a coincidence that essentially no one was actually protesting in favor of her release.

6) Most importantly, keep in mind that the West always has an axe to grind with Russia. Egypt, despite the deaths of hundreds and an actual military coup, is getting more than a billion dollars in military aid from the US. Ukraine, which more than anything just needs some money, is facing sanctions because less than 50 people have died in a political struggle. The hypocrisy and the extreme prejudice are appalling.

The West owes an incredible gratitude to Putin for his pivotal role in stabilizing several political crises over the last few years (Iran and Syria are largely Russian diplomacy efforts). There is a lot to dislike about his politics, but there's a lot to dislike about the politics of any country. We can call Russia corrupt and homophobic, but US politics aren't corrupt? The US isn't homophobic? People really need to stop fighting the Cold War and start looking at the world with a little sense of rationalism.

Similar things can be said about Yanukovich. He is legitimately and democratically elected. We can debate the effects of the centralization of powers under his control, but it is maddening that Western governments are forcing street diplomacy onto Ukraine because they do not like his politics. It is a huge disservice to Ukrainians, who deserve better than to be trapped in the middle of an East-West pissing contest.

7) One of the many paradoxes of the Maidan revolution is the status of Yanukovych. On the one hand, this man is a clown. He was always bad for Ukraine, and he made it worst during his presidency. He deserves almost everything that has happened to him over the last few months. The nearly universal hatred is well deserved.

While he talks about the fascists in the square, it's an unavoidable fact that he is primarily responsible for his ouster. A savvier politician wouldn't have passed the anti-protest laws that got everyone to the street; a better human being wouldn't have had snipers shoot civilians. And yet, despite all of this, Ukraine is worse off for the way that it got rid of him. The Maidan did serious damage to long-term democratic stability. Even if this crisis is resolved soon (and armed seizures of airports in Crimea show that this is only the beginning), this armed revolt have negative effects for many years.

8) Ultimately, recent events nail home a very under-appreciated aspect of Russia's foreign policy: the premium placed on stability. For very good reasons, Russians hate political and social upheaval. They can easily describe the huge human cost of various revolutions.

Most Americans, while perhaps possessing the more justifiable ideals than Putin's Russia, have no sense of proportion, restraint or humility in international affairs. We naively celebrate the fall of tyrants, and cheer on demonstrations for "democracy and freedom." When these situations become chaotic and people starting dying, we shrug our shoulders and foolishly blame "national character" or "lack of civilization" for the obvious effects of our own efforts at destabilization.

I hope for the best in Ukraine, but this is the second time in 10 years that the street has settled political problems. I can't see how this bodes well in the future. In Kyrgyzstan, another fractious Post-Soviet, each successive revolution has been more violent than the last. The negative effects of the instability linger, and you end up with pogroms against ethnic minorities.

I'm sure there are reasons to celebrate the fall of a thoroughly corrupt politician with authoritarian tendencies. But at the same time, I mourn for those people (half the country!) who supported and organized behind him. Russian-speakers should have little faith in the future of democratic Ukraine, as this is the second time that Westerners have overthrown a man that they worked to elect. Where do you go from here?